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Abstract
Generalizing Belnap's system of epistemic states [Bel77] we obtain the system of dis-
junctive factbases which is the paradigm for all other kinds of disjunctive knowledge bases.
Disjunctive factbases capture the nonmonotonic reasoning based on paraminimal models.
In the schema of a disjunctive factbase, certain predicates of the resp. domain are declared
to be exact, i.e. two-valued, and in turn some of these exact predicates are declared to be
subject to the Closed-World Assumption (CWA). Thus, we distinguish between three kinds
of predicates: inexact predicates, exact predicates subject to the CWA, and exact predicates
not subject to the CWA.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we shall address issues of disjunctive information processing, resp. disjunctive
knowledge representation and reasoning, such as the interplay between disjunctive and negative
information (concerning explicit negative information, negation-as-failure and the Closed-World
Assumption), and the notion of inclusive versus exclusive disjunctive information. These issues
have rst been discussed in the eld of disjunctive logic programming (see, e.g. [Min82, RT88,
Sak89, GL91, LMR92]). However, there is no generally acknowledged semantics for disjunctive
logic programs, and many proposals are not based on clear logical principles but seem to be
rather ad-hoc. It appears that the non-rule-related issues of disjunctive information processing
are complicated by the presence of deduction rules, and a semantical account for the interplay
between disjunctive, negative and deductive knowledge is hard to nd. Therefore, we believe it
is methodologically preferable to settle these issues in a simpler framework without rules, and
this is the approach taken here.
The concept of a knowledge representation and reasoning system, or shorter: knowledge
system (KS), consists essentially of two main components: an inference and an update operation
manipulating knowledge bases as abstract objects,1 together with a set of formal properties these
operations may have. In general, there are no specic restrictions on the internal structure of a
knowledge base. It appears, however, that a computational design can be achieved by `compiling'
incoming information into some normal form rather than leaving it in the form of arbitrarily
complex formulas. This is the case, for instance, in Belnap's KS which can be considered as a
paradigm for knowledge systems.
The concept of a KS constitutes a useful framework for the classication and comparison
of various computational systems and formalisms like, e.g., relational and deductive databases,
logic programs and other rule-based systems. It is more general than that of a logic (i.e. a
consequence relation). A standard logic can be viewed as a special kind of KS. On the other
hand, by dening the inference and update operations procedurally, KSs can serve as the basis for
the operational denition of logics. For instance, by appropriate settings of certain `parameters'
in the system of disjunctive factbases one can obtain three-valued and classical logic, in addition
to Belnap's four-valued logic.
In knowledge representation, two dierent notions of falsity arise in a natural way. Certain
facts are implicitly false by default by being not veried in any intended model of the knowledge
base. Others are explicitly false by virtue of a direct proof of their falsity, corresponding to
their falsication in all intended models. These two kinds of falsity in knowledge representation
are captured by the two negations, called weak and strong, of partial logic. In the monotonic
1This distinction was already proposed in [Lev84] where the resp. operations were called ASK and TELL.
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base system of partial logic, weak negation corresponds to classical negation by virtue of a
straightforward translation of partial logic into classical logic which is discussed in [HJW96].
In the nonmonotonic renements of partial logic based on (para-)minimal and stable reasoning,
weak negation corresponds to negation-as-failure, and hence can be used to express local Closed-
World Assumptions, default rules, and the like.
Both relational and deductive database systems can be considered as computational paradigms
of real world knowledge systems. They implement a form of nonmonotonic reasoning caused
by the use of negation-as-failure refering to default-implicit negative information. On the other
hand, relational and deductive databases, as well as normal logic programs, are not capable
of representing and processing explicit negative information. This shortcoming has led to the
extension of logic programming by adding a second negation (in addition to negation-as-failure)
as proposed independently in [GL90, GL91] and in [PW90, Wag91]. We call the general concept
of an operator expressing default-implicit negative information in the style of negation-as-failure
weak negation, and denote it by ` ', while the concept of an operator expressing explicit negative
information will be called strong negation, denoted by `'. Our concept of a vivid knowledge
system (VKS) is a two-fold generalization:
1. it extends already known logics, such as Belnap's 4-valued or Nelson's constructive logic,2
by adding weak negation, and
2. it extends already known knowledge systems, such as relational or deductive database
systems, by adding strong negation.
In the framework of a VKS, a specic meaning is assigned to the Closed-World Assumption: if
the Closed-World Assumption holds for a predicate, its weak negation implies its strong negation,
in other words, an atomic sentence formed with such a predicate is already false if it is false by
default.
In real world knowledge bases like, for instance, relational or deductive databases, it is
essential to be able to infer negative information by means of minimal (resp. stable) reasoning,
i.e. drawing inferences on the basis of minimal (resp. stable) models. Relational databases, being
nite sets of tables the rows of which represent atomic sentences, have traditionally been viewed
as nite models. On this account, answering a query F is rather based on the model relation,
M j= F , whereM is the nite interpretation corresponding to the database , and not on an
inference relation. However, especially with respect to the generalization of relational databases
(e.g. in order to allow for incomplete information), it seems to be more adequate to regard a
relational database as a set of atomic sentences A, and to infer a query F whenever it holds
in the unique minimal model of A, i.e.
A ` F :, Min(Mod(A))  Mod(F ),M j= F
While minimal models are adequate for denite extensional knowledge bases (such as factbases),
a renement of the notion of minimality, called paraminimality, is needed to capture the inclu-
siveness of disjunctive knowledge.
2See [Bel77], resp. [AN84].
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1.1 Preliminaries
A signature  = hRel ;ExRel ;Consti consists of a set of relation symbols Rel, a set ExRel  Rel
of exact relation symbols, and a set of constant symbols Const.3
We consider the following logical functors: conjunction (^), disjunction (_), strong negation
(), weak negation (alias negation-as-failure, denoted by  ), exclusive disjunction (j), and
the truth constant 1; relation symbols are denoted by p; q; r; : : :; constant symbols by c; d; : : :;
and variables by x; y; : : :. Quantiers, 9 and 8, are only incidentally considered. If F is a
set of logical functors, L(;F) denotes the corresponding set of wellformed formulas. L() =
L(;  ;;^; j;_) is the smallest set containing the atomic formulas of , and being closed with
respect to the following condition: if F;G 2 L(), then f F; F ; F ^G; F _G; F jGg  L().
With respect to a signature  we dene the following sublanguages: At() = L(; ;), the
set of all atomic sentences (also called atoms); Lit() = L(; ), the set of all literals; and
XLit() = Lit()[f l : l 2 Lit()g, the set of all extended literals. We shall frequently omit the
reference to a specic signature, and simply write L instead of L(). We introduce the following
convention: when L is a set of sentences, Lx denotes the corresponding set of formulas.
An atom a 2 At is called proper, if a 6= 1. We use a; b; : : :, l; k; : : :, e; f; : : :, and F;G;H; : : :
as metavariables for atoms, literals, extended literals and well-formed formulas, respectively.
With each negation a complement operation for the resp. type of literal is associated: ~a = a
and ga = a, l =  l and  l = l. These complements are also dened for sets of resp. literals
L  Lit, and E  XLit: eL = f~l : l 2 Lg, resp. E = fe : e 2 Eg. We distinguish between the
positive and negative elements of E  XLit by writing E+ := E \ Lit and E  := fl :  l 2 Eg.
If X is a set of sets, then Fin(X) denotes its restriction to nite elements. If Y is an ordered
set, then Min(Y ) denotes the set of all minimal elements of Y , i.e. Min(Y ) = fX 2 Y j :9X 0 2
Y : X 0 < Xg
Let L  L() be a nonempty language. An operation C : 2L ! 2L is called an inference
operation. The corresponding inference relation ` is dened by X ` F i F 2 C(X). An
inference operation (relation) is called a consequence operation (relation) if it satises Inclusion
(Reexivity), Idempotence (Transitivity), and Monotony.
A model-theoretic system hL; I ; j=i is determined by a language L, a set I whose elements are
called interpretations and amodel relation j= IL between interpretations and formulas. With
every model-theoretic system hL; I ; j=i, we can associate a model operator ModI, a consequence
operation CI, and a consequence relation j=I in the following way. Let X  L, then the
associated model operator is dened as ModI(X) = fI 2 I : I j= Xg, where I j= X i for
every F 2 X : I j= F . The associated consequence operation is dened by CI(X) = fF 2 L :
ModI(X)  ModI(F )g, and nally X j=I F i F 2 CI(X).
An inference operation C is called correct, resp. complete, with respect to the model-theoretic
system hL; I ; j=i i C(X)  CI(X), resp. C(X) = CI(X).
1.2 Partial Logics with Two Kinds of Negation
Denition 1 (Interpretation) Let  = hRel ;ExRel ;Consti be a signature. A partial Her-
brand -interpretation I consists of:
3For the sake of simplicity we shall not consider functional terms but only variables and constants; therefore,
we dene signatures without function symbols leading to a nite Herbrand universe.
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1. A set U , the universe or domain of I which is equal to the set of constant symbols, U =
Const ;
2. an assignment cI = c to every constant symbol c 2 Const;
3. an assignment of a pair hrI ; ~rIi to every relation symbol r 2 Rel such that
rI [ ~rI  Ua(r);
and in the special case of an exact relation symbol r 2 ExRel ,
rI [ ~rI = Ua(r);
where a(r) denotes the arity of r.
In the sequel we shall also simply say 'interpretation' instead of 'partial Herbrand interpretation'.
The class of all partial Herbrand -interpretations is denoted by I4(). We dene the classes
of coherent, of total, and of total coherent (or 2-valued) interpretations by
Ic() = fI 2 I4() : r
I \ ~rI = ; for all r 2 Relg
It() = fI 2 I4() : r
I [ ~rI = Ua(r) for all r 2 Relg
I2() = Ic() \ It()
The model relation j= I4()L(;  ;;^;_; j;9;8) between an interpretation and a sentence
is dened inductively as follows.
Denition 2 (Model Relation) 1. I j= r(c1; : : : ; cm) i hc1; : : : ; cmi 2 r
I.
I j= r(c1; : : : ; cm) i hc1; : : : ; cmi 2 ~r
I.
2. I j= F ^G i I j= F and I j= G.
3. I j= F _G i I j= F or I j= G.
4. I j= 9xF (x) i I j= F (c) for some c 2 Const.
5. I j= 8xF (x) i I j= F (c) for all c 2 Const.
6. I j=  F i I 6j= F .
All other cases of compound formulas are handled by the following DeMorgan-style rewrite rules:
 (F ^G)  ! F _ G  (F _G)  ! F ^ G
 9xF (x)  ! 8xF (x)  8xF (x)  ! 9xF (x)
F  ! F   F  ! F
and the denition for exclusive disjunction:
F jG  ! (F ^  G) _ (G ^  F )
in the sense that for every rewrite rule LHS  ! RHS , we dene I j= LHS i I j= RHS .
Mod denotes the model operator associated with the system hL(); I; j=i, and j= denotes
the resp. consequence relation, for  = 4; c; t; 2, i.e.
X j= F i Mod(X)  Mod(F )
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Denition 3 (Diagram) The diagram of I 2 I4() is dened as DI = fl 2 Lit() : I j= lg.
Observation 1 Partial Herbrand interpretations can be identied with their diagrams, i.e.
there is a one-to-one correspondence between I4() and 2
Lit().
Denition 4 (Extension) Let I and I 0 be two interpretations. We say that I 0 extends I,
symbolically I  I 0, if DI  DI0 .
Denition 5 (Minimal Models) For F 2 L()  X, and  = 4; c, we dene Modm (X) =
Min(Mod(X)), and X j=
m
 F i Mod
m
 (X)  Mod(F ).
Observation 2 An interpretation is the unique minimal model of its diagram: for  = 4; c,
and for every I 2 I(), Mod
m
 (DI) = fIg, and consequently, I j= F i DI j=
m
 F .
Formulas of partial logic (with two kinds of negation) can be normalized in the same manner as
those of classical logic. For this purpose, we introduce DNS(F ), the disjunctive normal set of a
formula F , which is dened as follows:
DNS(1) = f;g
DNS(e) = ffegg
DNS(F ^G) = fE [D : E 2 DNS(F ); D 2 DNS(G)g
DNS(F _G) = DNS(F ) [DNS(G)
All other cases of compound formulas can be handled by the above and the following DeMorgan-
style rewrite rules:
 (F _G)  !  F ^  G  (F ^G)  !  F _  G
 (F _G)  !  F _  G  (F ^G)  !  F ^  G
 F  !  F    F  ! F
  F  !  F






Observation 3 Let F 2 L(;^;_). Then,
1. Modm4 (F )  DNS(F ).
2. DNS(F )  Mod4(F ).
2 Knowledge Systems
Before presenting the formal denitions, we start with a semi-formal discusssion of the basic con-
cepts to be introduced, notably: knowledge base, query, inference, answer, information ordering,
input and update.
In general, a knowledge base (KB) can consist of any kind of data structures capable of
representing knowledge, e.g. a set, or multiset, or sequence, of (logical) expressions, or a directed
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graph, etc. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that a KB is a set of expressions from
a representation language. Only certain formulas may make sense for representing knowledge,
that is, there will be a specic representation language LRepr, and a KB will be a (usually nite)
collection of elements of LRepr, possibly constrained in some way determined by the set LKB of
all admissible KBs: KB 2 LKB  2
LRepr . Likewise, since not every formula may be appropriate
as a sensible query, the set of admissible queries is specied by LQuery.
The basic scenario of a knowledge system (KS) consists of two operations: an inference
operation processing queries posed to the KB, and an update operation processing inputs entered
by users or by other (e.g. sensoric) information suppliers. A KS restricts the admissible inputs
to elements of a specic input language LInput, and an update is performed by processing the
input formula in an appropriate way in order to assimilate its information content into the KB.
Since it appears reasonable to require that any information entered to a KB can be queried
afterwards, we shall assume that LInput  LQuery.
Denition 6 (Knowledge System) An abstract knowledge system K is a quintuple:4
K = hLKB; `; LQuery; Upd; LInput i
where the inference relation `  LKBLQuery, together with the update operation Upd : LKB 
LInput ! LKB, satisfy for any X 2 LKB,
(KS1) X ` 1, and Upd(X; 1) = X.
(KS2) LInput  LQuery.
(KS3) Upd(X;F ) ` F , for any F 2 LInput which is consistent with X.
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If elements of LKB are nite sets (resp. structures), K is called nitary. In the sequel, we shall
sometimes simply write `KB' in formal expressions standing for an arbitrary knowledge base
X 2 LKB. An inference operation C is dened as usual:
C(KB) = fF 2 LQuery : KB ` Fg
Also, an answer operation taking a knowledge base and an open query formula, and providing
the corresponding set of valid answers, can be dened in terms of the inference relation.
Denition 7 (Answer Operation) If KB is denite,6 an answer to an open query formula
F (x) is a tuple, and the set of all answers is a relation:
Ans(KB; F (x)) = ft : KB ` F (t)g
4The formulation of a KS in terms of query and input processing was already implicitly present in Belnap's
[1977] view of a KS. In [Lev84] it was proposed as a `functional approach to knowledge representation'. In [Wag94]
the concept of knowledge systems was further extended and used as an integrating framework for knowledge
representation and logic programming.
5According to some notion of consistency associated with the abstract knowledge system. E.g., one might
want to exclude contradictory pieces of information from this reexivity principle: Upd(fpg; p) 6` p. We shall
not discuss this issue in the present paper, however.
6KB is called denite if KB ` F _G implies that either KB ` F , or KB ` G, where ` is a constructive inference
relation (see below).
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where x is a variable (tuple) and t a constant (tuple). In general, however, an answer may
be indenite, i.e. a minimal set of possible answer substitutions corresponding to a minimal
disjunctive consequence:
Ans(KB; F (x)) = Min(fT : KB `
_
fF (t) : t 2 Tgg)
Not all open query formulas can be answered sensibly. We therefore require that queries are
evaluable.7 Answers to evaluable queries on the basis of denite KBs may be computed by
means of relational algebra operations, such as projection, selection, set dierence, union, and
join. For instance,
Ans(KB; F (x; y) ^G(y; z)) = Ans(KB; F (x; y)) 1 Ans(KB; G(y; z))
In many cases, it is useful to be able to update by a set of inputs and we `overload' the symbol
Upd to denote also this more general update operation
Upd : LKB  2
LInput ! LKB
which has to be dened in such a way that for any niteA  LInput, Upd(KB; A) = Upd(KB;
V
A).
We sometimes write KB+F as an abbreviation of Upd(KB; F ), resp. KB F as an abbreviation
of Upd(KB; F ).
Example 1 (Factbases) A KB consisting of ground literals (viewed as positive and negative
facts) is called a factbase. For instance, the factbase
X1 = fr(S); r(P ); s(S);s(L);s(T ); m(P;L); m(T; S)g
may represent the information that Susan and Peter are residents, Susan is a smoker, Linda
and Tom are nonsmokers, Peter is married with Linda, and Tom is married with Susan.
As a kind of natural deduction from positive and negative facts an inference relation ` between
a factbase X  Lit and a sentence is dened in the following way:8
(` a) X ` a if a 2 X
(` a) X ` a if a 2 X
(`  l) X `  l if l 62 X
(` ^) X ` F ^G if X ` F & X ` G
(` _) X ` F _G if X ` F or X ` G
(` j) X ` F jG if X ` F ^ G or X ` G ^ F
(` 9) X ` 9xF (x) if X ` F (c) for some constant c
For instance, one might ask X1 \who is married with a non-resident ?",
Ans(X1; 9y[m(x; y) ^  r(y)]) = fhP ig
answered by \Peter", or \who is married with a nonsmoker ?",
Ans(X1; 9y[m(x; y) ^ s(y)]) = fhP ig
7See [vGT91] for the notion of evaluable, resp. domain-independent, formulas.
8This inductive denition is completed by the DeMorgan-style rewrite rules listed in section 1.2.
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also answered by \Peter". The only updates we consider are insertions, Upd(X; l) := X [ flg,
of literals. For K  Lit, we have Upd(X;K) = X [K. The knowledge system of factbases is
then dened as
F := h 2Lit; `; L( ;;^;_; j;9); Upd; Lit i
The restricted system where weak negation and exclusive disjunction are excluded from the query
language, LQuery = L(;^;_), is denoted by F
+.
It is easy to check that KS1, KS2 and KS3 hold.
Observation 4 The inference relation of F captures model-based reasoning, resp. minimal
reasoning on the basis of denite knowledge, in partial logic. Every factbase corresponds to the
diagram of a partial Herbrand model, and for every F 2 L( ;;^;_; j;9) and every I 2 I4, it
holds that DI ` F i I j= F , and consequently, for every X  Lit,
X ` F i X j=m4 F
where j=m4 denotes entailment based on 4-valued minimal models (see denition 5).
Whenever we deal with both kinds of negation, the strong negation  is the principal negation
operator (expressing explicit falsity), and the weak negation   is an auxiliary negation operator
(used, e.g., to express the CWA, see below). Sometimes we shall also make use of the symbol
: standing either for classical negation (which diers from both  and  ), or for an arbitrary
negation.
2.1 Regular Knowledge Systems
In order to compare knowledge bases in terms of their information content we assume that there
is an information, or knowledge ordering  between KBs such that
KB1  KB2 if KB2 contains at least as much information as KB1.
The information ordering should be dened in terms of the structural components of knowledge
bases and not in terms of higher-level notions (like derivability).9 The informationally empty
KB will be denoted by 0. By denition, 0  X for all X 2 LKB, i.e. 0 is the least element of
hLKB;i.
In general, more information does not mean more consequences. In other words: answers
are not necessarily preserved under growth of information. Queries, for which this is the case,
are called persistent.
Denition 8 (Persistent Queries) A closed, resp. open, query formula F is called persis-
tent if 8X1;X2 2 LKB : X1 ` F ) X2 ` F , resp. Ans(X1; F )  Ans(X2; F ), whenever
X1  X2. If all F 2 LQuery are persistent, the KS and its inference relation ` are called per-
sistent. The set of all persistent query formulas is denoted by LPersQ. An operator of the query
language is called persistent, if every query formed with it and with persistent subformulas is
again persistent.
9The usual way to compare the information content of two KBs in standard logic, namely by means of checking
the inclusion of consequences: KB1  KB2 if C(KB1)  C(KB2), does not work in a nonmonotonic setting.
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Denition 9 (Ampliative Inputs) An input formula F is called (i) ampliative10 if KB 
Upd(KB; F ), or (ii) reductive if KB  Upd(KB; F ). A KS and its update operation Upd are
called ampliative, if all inputs F 2 LInput are ampliative. The set of all ampliative input formulas
is denoted by LAmpI.
A certain subset LUnit  LInput designates those elementary expressions which will be called
information units, e.g. atoms, literals, or weighted (resp. labelled, or annotated) atoms, and
the like. An information unit represents an elementary piece of information with a positive
information content. A knowledge base may contain contradictory pieces of information, and we
assume that all inconsistent information units contained in X 2 LKB are collected by Inc(X) 
LUnit.
Denition 10 (Regular KS) A knowledge system K is called regular, if there is a preorder
hLKB;; 0i with least element 0, a designated set LUnit  LInput, and an operation Inc : LKB !
2LUnit, such that
(KS4) Unit inputs increase the information content (at least if they are consistent): X  X + u,
for any X 2 LKB, and for any u 2 LUnit, such that u 62 Inc(X), and Inc(X+u)  Inc(X).
(KS5) The information ordering is compatible with ampliative update and persistent inference:
for all X1;X2 2 LKB,
X1  X2 i 8F 2 LAmpI8G 2 LPersQ : X1 + F ` G ) X2 + F ` G
(KS6) Ampliative inputs are persistent queries: LAmpI = LPersQ \ LInput.
(KS7) Consistent Inference: for any X 2 LKB, and any F 2 LInput, X ` F implies Inc(X+F ) 
Inc(X).
A regular KS will be represented as a 9-tuple
h 0; ; LKB; `; LQuery; Upd; LInput; Inc; LUnit i
Denition 11 (Consistency)
1. KB is called consistent, if Inc(KB) = ;.
2. F 2 LInput is called consistent, if Inc(0 + F ) = ;.
3. F 2 LInput is called consistent within X 2 LKB, if
(a) F is consistent, and
(b) Inc(X + F )  Inc(X) (requiring that F does not increase the inconsistency of X),
and
(c) for every u 2 Inc(X), 0 + F   u ` F (requiring that the information of F is not
already inconsistent in X).
10The name is adopted from [Bel77].
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Example 2 (Standard Logics) A standard logic (such as classical, or intuitionistic, logic),
given by a language L and a consequence relation ` 2L  L, resp. by the corrresponding
consequence operation C, can be viewed as an innitary knowledge system
h ;; ; fX 2 2L : X = C(X)g; `; L; Upd; L; Inc; L i
where 1) a KB is a deductively closed set of formulas, 2) the knowledge ordering is set inclusion,
3) update by F is the addition of F and subsequent closure, i.e. Upd(X;F ) = C(X [ fFg),11
4) the query, unit and input languages are all equal to L, and 5) Inc(X) = ; if X 6= L, and
Inc(X) = X otherwise. KS1{KS7 hold, more or less, trivially. Notice, however, that it is not
clear whether a standard logic corresponds to a sensible nitary knowledge system, because set
inclusion is no longer an adequate knowledge ordering if KBs are not deductively closed (KS5 is
violated).
Example 3 (Factbases) The knowledge system of factbases is also regular:
F := h ;; ; 2Lit; `; L( ;;^;_; j;9); Upd; Lit; Inc; Lit i
where Inc(X) = X \ eX . We have to show that KS4{KS6 hold. Proof: it is obvious that KS4
holds. Since LAmpI = Lit, and LPersQ = L(;^;_), KS5 follows by straightforward induction
on the complexity of queries (it corresponds to the permanence principle of partial logic). KS6
and KS7 are again obvious. 2
2.2 Formal Properties of Knowledge Systems
2.2.1 Basic Properties of Inference and Update
Denition 12 (Constructive Inference) Let L  Lit be an arbitrary set of literals, and
dLe := Upd(0; L). Then ` is called constructive if it satises (i) constructible truth, and (ii)
constructible falsity, i.e. both of the following conditions: for any F;G 2 LQuery: (i) dLe ` F _G
implies dLe ` F or dLe ` G; (ii) dLe `  (F ^G) implies dLe ` F or dLe ` G.
The property of constructive inference guarantees that, on the basis of denite knowledge, query
formulas are decomposable. Obviously, the rst condition (of constructible truth) excludes the
possibility of certain disjunctive tautologies such as the classical tertium non datur, whereas its
negative counterpart excludes, for instance, the dual principle of contradiction.
The next property (due to Urbas [Urb90]) excludes the possibility of trivial inferences, i.e.
non-tautological inferences which are solely based on the form of a KB and a query and not on
their content. For example, fs(L);s(L)g ` m(P; S) is such a trivial inference which is valid in
classical logic, i.e. from contradictory information on Linda being a smoker, we may infer that
Peter is married with Susan, and thus we would get (innitely many) unsensible answers to any
query. This is clearly undesirable in a knowledge system.
Denition 13 (Tautology) F 2 LQuery is called a tautology in a knowledge system, if
X ` F for all X 2 LKB.
11Notice that this corresponds to the AGM expansion of `belief sets', see [Gar88].
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Denition 14 (Non-Explosive Inference) An inference relation ` is called non-explosive
if for every non-tautology F 2 LQuery, and for every knowledge base X > 0, there is a variant
F 0 of F (obtained by uniform substitution of propositional constituents) such that X 6` F 0.
While most standard logics allow for trivial inferences, their positive fragments and certain
paraconsistent logics, such as Belnap's [Bel77] four-valued, or Nelson's [AN84] paraconsistent
constructive logic, are non-explosive.
The following important property guarantees the freedom of knowledge base evolution.
Denition 15 (Input Completeness) A KS is called input complete if
8X1;X2 2 LKB 9A  LInput : X2 = Upd(X1; A)
Observation 5 A KS is input complete i KBs are both input constructible and input de-
structible, i.e. both of the following conditions hold:
(i) 8X 2 LKB 9A  LInput : X = Upd(0; A)
(ii) 8X 2 LKB 9A  LInput : Upd(X;A) = 0
Further formal properties of knowledge systems are discussed in [Wag94b].
2.2.2 Nonmonotonicity
The following denition captures the idea that a system is considered monotonic if all conse-
quences of a KB are preserved after it is updated by some new piece of information.
Denition 16 (Monotonicity) A KS is called monotonic if for all X 2 LKB, and all F 2
LInput, we have C(X)  C(Upd(X;F )).
Though fundamental in the theory of consequence operations due to Tarski, this is too strong a
requirement for knowledge systems in general.
There are two `parameters' on which Monotonicity depends: the update operation may be
ampliative or not, and the inference relation may be persistent or not.
Observation 6 A KS is monotonic if it is ampliative and persistent.12
Proof: For any X 2 LKB, and any F 2 LInput, we get X  Upd(X;F ) by Ampliative Update,
and consequently C(X)  C(Upd(X;F )), by Persistent Inference. 2
Practical systems will be nonmonotonic since they will allow for non-persistent queries (by
means of negation-as-failure) and for non-ampliative updates (by means of deletion, resp. con-
traction).
12Or, rather exotically, if all inputs are reductive and all queries are `antipersistent', i.e. preserved under
information decrease. It is still an open problem, whether { or under which conditions { the converse holds.
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2.3 Vivid Knowledge Systems
The idea of vividness as a design principle for knowledge systems was rst proposed by Levesque
in [Lev86]. However, while for Levesque the main issue was to have complete information, we
have generalized and redened the notion of vividness based on two fundamental principles:
cognitive adequacy and computational feasibility.13
Denition 17 (VKS) A knowledge system K is called a vivid knowledge system (VKS), if
it is a conservative extension of A, the system of relational databases, i.e. if there are mappings
f : 2At ! LKB, and g : L( ;^;_;9) ! LQuery, such that for any relational database X  At,
any input F 2 At [At, and any query G 2 L( ;^;_;9),
Upd(X;F ) ` G i Upd(X̂; F̂ ) ` Ĝ
where we abbreviate X̂ = f(X), F̂ = g(F ), and Ĝ = g(G).
It is easy to check that F , the system of factbases, is a VKS.
We distinguish between positive and general knowledge systems. In a positive KS, such
as A, only positive knowledge is represented. In a general vivid knowledge system we have
two kinds of negation: in addition to the weak negation (being able to express default-implicit
negative information in the style of negation-as-failure), there is a second negation (called strong)
expressing explicit falsity.
It is desirable for a KS to be robust towards any possible update. This includes inputs which
are inconsistent with the current knowledge base. Such inputs may be erroneous, but it might
be as well the case that the new input is correct, and some old piece of information in the KB
is erroneous or outdated. In any case, it seems important that the main functions of a KS are
not corrupted by inconsistent inputs. Thus, a sophisticated inconsistency handling mechanism
might prevent that both a query formula and its negation can ever be inferred from a KB even
if the KB contains contradictory information.
Denition 18 (Inherently Consistent Inference) An inference relation ` is called in-
herently consistent with respect to a negation operator :, if for every X 2 LKB and every
F 2 LQuery, it is never the case that X ` :F and X ` F .
Notice that this holds trivially if we make the restriction that LKB admits only of consistent
KBs. But such a restriction is not realistic. We shall assume, therefore, that LKB also contains
inconsistent KBs. In this case, inference in classical logic is not inherently consistent. In fact,
Inherently Consistent Inference is violated by any negation satisfying the classical explosion
principle ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet, fF;:Fg ` G. But it is also violated by those
paraconsistent logics where contradictions are derivable, fF;:Fg ` F ^:F , such as in Belnap's
4-valued logic.
Observation 7 Inference in F is inherently consistent wrt weak negation:
8X 2 2Lit8F 2 L( ;;^;_) : X 6` F ^  F
13This is further discussed in [Wag94].
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Although we do not make it a strict requirement, it seems desirable for a KS that the following
coherence14 property, relating weak with strong negation, holds.
Denition 19 (Negation Coherence) A knowledge system with weak and strong negation
satises Negation Coherence, if for any consistent X 2 LKB, and any F 2 LQuery, X `  F
whenever X ` F .
Denition 20 (Minimal Change) 15 Let u 2 LUnit be any information unit. We say that
Upd satises the principle of Minimal Change if it satises both Minimal Change for Unit
Expansion and for Unit Contraction. For any X;X 0 2 LKB, and any u 2 LUnit, such that u is
consistent with X, we require the following:
(Minimal Change for Unit Expansion) X + u := Upd(X;u) is the least extension of X such
that u can be inferred, expressed by the conditions (+1) and (+2):
(+1) X + u  X
(+2) X 0  X & X 0 ` u ) X + u  X 0
(Minimal Change for Unit Contraction) X   u := Upd(X; u) is the greatest reduction of X
such that  u can be inferred, expressed by ( 1) and ( 2):
( 1) X   u  X
( 2) X 0  X & X 0 `  u ) X   u  X 0
2.4 A Further Example: Deductive Factbases
A deductive factbase is a pair hX;Ri consisting of a factbase X and a set R of range-restricted
rules, called deduction rules. A non-ground rule r = l F may be formed with any conclusion
formula l 2 Litx, and any premise formula F 2 Lx( ;;^;_; j;9), such that 1) Free(l) 
Free(F ), and 2) F is evaluable. The set of such rules which are called range-restricted is denoted
by R(Lit L( ;;^;_; j;9)).
For a non-ground rule r = l(x) F (x), its application to a fact base X is dened by
r(X) := Upd(X; fl(c) : c 2 Const & X ` F (c)g)
In the basic setting, deduction rules are not aected by updates, i.e. only `extensional' predicates
may be updated:
Updd(hX;Ri; l) = hUpd(X; l); Ri
But deduction rules help to answer queries:
hX;Ri `d F i R(X) ` F
where we assume that R(X)  Lit is the unique intended deductive closure of X under R,
according to the following denition.
14The name is adopted from [PA92].
15This principle was already proposed in [Bel77] under the name of minimal mutilation. It is also one of the
fundamental principles of AGM-style belief revision, see e.g. [Gar88].
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Denition 21 (Deductive Closure) A factbase Z 2 2Lit is called a deductive closure of a
deductive factbase hX;Ri, if
1. Z is closed under R, i.e. r(Z) = Z for all r 2 R, and
2. Z is supported, i.e. Z = rn  : : :r1(X), for some sequence of ground rules (ri)1in  [R],
and
3. Z  X, i.e. Z contains all `facts' from X.
where [R] denotes the instantiation of R. If all rules in R have persistent premise formulas,
there is a unique minimal closure of a factbase X under R which is naturally the intended one.
It can be computed by successively detaching applicable rules until all rules are satised. If R
contains rules with non-persistent premise formulas, there may be several minimal closures, and
not all of them might be intended.16
Example 4 In the factbase X1 from example 1, we cannot infer that Peter is not married with
Susan because the CWA does not hold for married. However, one could argue, that since both
Peter and Susan are residents, it should suce that there is no record of their marriage in the
local KB in order to conclude that they really are not married. This can be expressed by the
following deduction rule
r1 = m(x; y) r(x) ^ r(y) ^ m(x; y)
which yields the deductive factbase hX1; fr1gi. We obtain the inference
hX1; fr1gi ` m(P; S)
since the unique intended closure of X1 under fr1g, r1(X1), contains m(P; S):
r1(X1) = X1 [ fm(S; P ); m(P; S)g
Formally, the system of deductive factbases is dened as
DF := h h;; ;i; d; 2
Lit  2R(Lit L( ;;^;_;j;9)); `d; L( ;;^;_; j;9); Updd; Lit; Incd; Lit i
The knowledge ordering of deductive factbases d is dened by
hX;Ri d hX
0; R0i :() 8l 2 Lit : R(Upd(X; l))  R0(Upd(X 0; l))
The inconsistency measure Incd is dened by Incd(hX;Ri) = Inc(R(X)).
16In general, the intended closures are selected from the set of all closures by means of an appropriate preference
criterion, such as the stability of rule application as in the stable closure semantics of [Wag94b].
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3 Belnap's Epistemic States
A KS, according to Belnap, answers queries by invoking some inference mechanism, and it
accepts input from a variety of sources by using an appropriate update mechanism. In such
circumstances inconsistency threatens. Mr. X tells the KS that A while Mrs. Y tells it that
A. Or, in a dierent environment, an automatic measurement yields that m > 0:3 while the
subsequent conrmation attempt yields that m < 0:3.
What is the KS to do ?
Possibility 1: Refuse to accept inconsistent information. However: this is unfair either to Mr.
X or to Mrs. Y. Also, contradictions may not lie on the surface.
Possibility 2: Revise current beliefs in the presence of contradictions. However: it seems to
be dicult to determine the proper revision policy doing justice to both Mr. X and Mrs.
Y, and it seems to be even more dicult to mechanize it in a satisfactory way.
Possibility 3: Just accept contradictions and report them exactly as they were told, so the
user can make up her mind.
Belnap advocates possibility 3, but emphasizes that even if the ultimate goal is possibility 2, i.e.
revision, possibility 3 is a good rst step towards that goal.
In order to be able to process arbitrary input formulas F 2 L(;^;_), an epistemic state
has to consist of a set of possible situation descriptions (corresponding to partial interpretations,
called `set-ups' by Belnap). Thus, an epistemic state Y is a subset of 2Lit, and the elements of
Y represent dierent epistemic alternatives. For instance, if we know that Susan is a nonsmoker
and that Peter is married either with Linda or with Susan, we get the following epistemic state:
Y1 = ffs(S); m(P;L)g; fs(S);m(P; S)gg
3.1 Formalization
Following Belnap, yet formulated in a dierent way, inputs to an epistemic state are processed
as follows:
UpdB(Y; l) = fX [ flg : X 2 Y g
UpdB(Y; F ^G) = UpdB(UpdB(Y; F ); G)
UpdB(Y; F _G) = UpdB(Y; F ) [ UpdB(Y;G)
All other cases of compound formulas are treated by DeMorgan-style rewriting (see the rewrite
rules above). Notice that UpdB may create inconsistent situation descriptions even if there are
consistent alternatives. It seems, however, more appropriate to discard inconsistent situation
descriptions if they are not minimally inconsistent,17 i.e. if there are alternatives with `less
inconsistency'. For this purpose we dene
Cons(Y ) := fX 2 Y jX \ eX = ;g
MInc(Y ) := fX 2 Y j :9Z 2 Y : (Z \ eZ)  (X \ eX)g
17The principle of minimal inconsistency was proposed in [Pri89].
16
The rst operator, Cons, accepts only consistent situation descriptions, while the second one,
MInc, accepts all situation descriptions which are minimally inconsistent. If an epistemic state
Y is consistent, i.e. if it contains at least one consistent epistemic alternative, then Cons(Y ) =
MInc(Y ). We can now dene
Updex(Y; F ) := Cons(UpdB(Y; F ))
Updmi(Y; F ) := MInc(UpdB(Y; F ))
Updex does not accept inconsistent inputs at all. It implements the ex contradictione sequitur
quodlibet (ECSQ) principle of classical logic by discarding all inconsistent epistemic alternatives.
A good compromise between the hypersensitive inconsistency handling mechanism of Updex
and the too liberal UpdB is the principle of minimal inconsistency proposed in [Pri89], and
implemented by Updmi.
A query formula F 2 L(;^;_) can be inferred from an epstemic state Y if it can be inferred
from every possible situation description X 2 Y :
Y ` F :() for all X 2 Y : X ` F;
where X ` F is the inference relation of F+.
The process of information growth can be captured by the following notion of informational
extension. An epistemic state Y 0 is called an (informational) extension of Y , symbolically
Y  Y 0, if every epistemic alternative in Y 0 extends one in Y :
Denition 22 (Information Ordering) Y  Y 0 :() 8X 0 2 Y 0 9X 2 Y : X  X 0
This ordering, used in [Bel77], was also suggested in domain theory for the semantics of parallel
processes (see [Plo76, Smy78]), and is sometimes called `Smyth ordering'.
Observation 8 h22
Lit
;i is a preorder with least element 0 := f;g.
Notice that while fLitg is informationally larger than any non-empty epistemic state Y  2Lit,
the empty epistemic state is still larger:
Y  fLitg < fg
The elementary pieces of information in epistemic states are disjunctions of literals l1 _ : : :_ lm.
The set of all such disjunctions is denoted by Lit_. The inconsistency operation IncB now
collects all denite and indenite contradictions:
IncB(Y ) := f
_
L : L 2 Min(fK  Lit j 8X 2 Y 9l 2 K : l 2 X \ eXg) g
Denition 23 (Belnap's KS)
B := h f;g; ; 22
Lit
; `; L(;^;_); UpdB ; L(;^;_); IncB ; Lit
_ i
is called Belnap's KS. Besides B, we also dene
Bmi with LKB = fY 2 2
2Lit : Y = MInc(Y )g, and Updmi, and
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Bex with LKB = fY 2 2
2Lit : Y = Cons(Y )g and Updex.
We have to show that KS1{KS6 are satised.
KS1 and KS2 are obvious.
KS3: Reexivity is proved by induction on input formulas. Clearly, Upd(Y; l) ` l, since l is added
to every element of Y . For conjunctive inputs we obtain Upd(Y; F ^G) = (Y + F ) +G ` G, by
the induction hypothesis, and since B is persistent and ampliative (see the resp. observations
below), it follows from Y + F ` F that (Y + F ) +G ` F , and hence (Y + F ) +G ` F ^G. For
disjunctive inputs, Upd(Y; F _G) = (Y + F ) [ (Y +G) ` F _G, since for every X 2 (Y + F ),
it holds by the induction hypothesis that X ` F , hence X ` F _ G, and similarly for every
X 2 (Y +G).
KS4: easy to check.
KS5: It suces to show that Y1  Y2 i C(Y1)  C(Y2). The ())-part, i.e. Persistent Inference,
is proved below. We show the contraposition of the (()-part. Assume Y1 6 Y2, i.e. 9X2 2
Y28X1 2 Y19l 2 X1  X2. Let X
0
2 be such an element of Y2. Then we can construct a formula
F =
W
fl 2 Lit j 9X1 2 Y1 : l 2 X1  X
0
2g, for which Y1 ` F , but Y2 6` F .
KS6: Follows immediately from the fact that B is persistent and ampliative (see the resp.
observations below). 2
Observation 9 Only the minimal elements of an epistemic state count: C(Y ) = C(Min(Y )).
Proof: In F+, for X;X 0  Lit it holds that C(X)  C(X 0) whenever X  X 0. Consequently,
C(Y ) =
\
fC(X) : X 2 Y g =
\
fC(X) : X 2Min(Y )g 2
Observation 10 (Persistent Inference) In B, ` is persistent, i.e. if Y1  Y2 then Y2 ` F
whenever Y1 ` F for all F 2 L(;^;_).
Proof: Let Y1  Y2. Then,
C(Y1) =
\
fC(X1) jX1 2 Y1g

\
fC(X1) jX1 2 Y1 & 9X2 2 Y2 : X1  X2g

\
fC(X2) jX2 2 Y2 & 9X1 2 Y1 : X1  X2g
=
\
fC(X2) jX2 2 Y2g
= C(Y2) 2
Observation 11 (Ampliative Update) Y  UpdB(Y; F )  Updmi(Y; F )  Updex(Y; F )
Proof: It suces to show that Y  UpdB(Y; F ) by straightforward induction on the complexity
of F . 2
Claim 1 B, Bmi and Bex satisfy Monotonicity, i.e. C(Y )  C(Upd(Y; F )).
Proof: The assertion follows as a corollary from the two previous observations and observation
6. 2
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3.2 Relation to Standard Logics
Recall that DNS(F ) denotes the disjunctive normal set corresponding to the disjunctive normal
form of F .
Observation 12
1. UpdB(Y; F ) = fX [K : X 2 Y;K 2 DNS(F )g.
2. UpdB(0; F ) = DNS(F ).
Proof: See [Wag94]. This observation implies that Contraction and Permutation hold in B.
Claim 2 (Four-Valued Logic) Let X 2 Fin(2L(;^;_)), and F 2 L(;^;_), then
X j=4 F i UpdB(0;X) ` F
Proof: From the previous observation it follows that Modm4 (X)  UpdB(0;X)  Mod4(X).
This, together with the fact that j=4 is determined by minimal models, i.e.
Modm4 (F )  Mod4(G) ) Mod4(F )  Mod4(G)
yields the assertion. 2
Claim 3 (Three-Valued Logic) Recall that standard (= Kleene's strong) 3-valued propo-
sitional logic corresponds to j=c.
X j=c F i Updex(0;X) ` F
and moreover, if X is consistent, then
X j=c F i Updmi(0;X) ` F
Proof: If X is not consistent, i.e. it does not have a coherent model, then Updex(0;X) = fg,
and the assertion holds trivially. Otherwise every minimal coherent model of X corresponds to
a consistent element of UpdB(0;X), and
Modmc (X)  Updex(0;X) = Updmi(0;X)  Modc(X)
This, together with the fact that j=c restricted to L(;^;_) is determined by minimal models,
i.e.
Modmc (X)  Modc(F ) ) Modc(X)  Modc(F )
yields the assertion. 2
Claim 4 (Classical Logic) Let X;F be as before, let At(X;F ) denote the set of all atoms
occuring in X and F , and j=2 denote classical propositional logic. Then,
X j=2 F i Updex(Updex(0;X); fa _ a : a 2 At(X;F )g) ` F
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3.3 Problems with Belnap's KS
We briey discuss three problems with B.
3.3.1 No Unique Representation
In B, epistemic states are not unique representations: C(Y ) = C(Y 0) does not imply that
Y = Y 0. For instance,
C(ffpgg) = C(ffpg; fp; qgg)
A possible remedy consists of admitting only minimal situation descriptions as elements of an
epistemic state. An epistemic state Y is called canonical if Y = Min(Y ). We denote the set of
all canonical elements of a set of epistemic states Y  22
Lit
by Can(Y).
We obtain the following system:
B
m := h f;g; ; Can(22
Lit
); `; L(;^;_); UpdmB ; Lit; L(;^;_) i
where UpdmB (Y; F ) := Min(UpdB(Y; F )). The collection of all canonical epistemic states forms
a lattice, as was shown in [KM93].
Observation 13 hCan(22
Lit
); i is a lattice order. Meet and join can be dened by Y1uY2 =
Min(Y1 [ Y2), and Y1 t Y2 = Min(fX1 [X2 : X1 2 Y1; X2 2 Y2g).
3.3.2 No Disjunctive Syllogism
For instance,
UpdB(0; (p _ q) ^ p) = ffp;pg; fq;pgg 6` q
Notice that the resulting epistemic state contains an inconsistent situation description although
there is a consistent epistemic alternative.
The Disjunctive Syllogism holds in Bex, where all inconsistent epistemic alternatives are
discarded. In this system, however, if Y ` l then Upd(Y; ~l) = fg yields an `exploded' KB in the
sense that everything follows from fg, i.e. Bex is explosive. A good compromise seems to be
Bmi which is both non-explosive and satises the Disjunctive Syllogism.
Example 5 If we have the above Y1, and we then learn that Susan or Linda smokes, the
following update is performed in Bmi:
Y2 := Updmi(Y1; s(S) _ s(L))
= MInc(ffs(S);s(S);m(P;L)g; fs(S);s(S);m(P; S)g;
fs(L);s(S);m(P;L)g; fs(L);s(S);m(P; S)gg)
= f fs(L);m(P;L);s(S)g; fs(L);m(P; S);s(S)g g
` s(L)
3.3.3 No Input Completeness
Finite epistemic states are input constructible in B, i.e.
8Y 2 Fin(2Fin(2
Lit))9F 2 LInput : Y = UpdB(0; F )
but since they are not input destructible, B does not satisfy Input Completeness.
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4 Disjunctive Factbases
In a similar way as we have extended the monotonic system F+ to obtain Belnap's monotonic
disjunctive KS in section 3, we now want to extend the nonmonotonic system F to obtain a
nonmonotonic disjunctive KS. However, such an extension is not straightforward for at least two
reasons. First, if we would simply extend the query language of B by adding weak negation,
lemmas would be no longer compatible. This is easy to see. Consider the following example:
ffpgg ` p _ q
but UpdB(ffpgg; p _ q) = ffpg; fp; qgg 6`  q
while ffpgg `  q 2
Consequently, we should rather choose Bm as the basis of our extension, since
UpdmB (ffpgg; p _ q) = ffpgg
But then we get another problem: disjunctive information would be always exclusive in the
sense that UpdmB (0; p _ q) `  p _  q. And this is clearly undesirable. To remedy the problem,
we have to use another notion of minimality called paraminimality in [HJW96]. We rst dene
MinX(Y ) = fX
0 2 Min(Y ) : X 0  Xg, and by means of it an operator collecting all paraminimal
elements:
PMin(Y ) = fX 2 Y j :9X 0 2 Y : X 0 < X & MinX0(Y ) = MinX(Y )g
An ordered set Y is called paracanonical if Y = PMin(Y ). The set of all paracanonical elements
of a set of ordered sets Y is denoted by PCan(Y).
Disjunctive factbases are paracanonical epistemic states. For Y 2 PCan(22
Lit
), and F 2
L( ;;^;_; j;9), inference is dened elementwise:
Y ` F :() for all X 2 Y : X ` F
where X ` F is inference in F . For example,
Y1 ` s(S) ^ [m(P;L) jm(P; S)]
The information ordering between disjunctive factbases Y1; Y2  2
Lit is the same ordering as
in B. Likewise, information units and the inconsistency operation are the same. Inputs are
processed as follows:
(Ul) UpdB(Y; l) = fX [ flg : X 2 Y g
(U^) UpdB(Y; F ^G) = UpdB(UpdB(Y; F ); G)
(U_) UpdB(Y; F _G) = PMin(UpdB(Y; F ) [ UpdB(Y;G) [ UpdB(Y; F ^G))
We dene the same additional update operations Updmi, and Updex, as inB. The only dierence
with respect to update inB is the denition (U_) for disjunctive inputs which renders disjunctive
information now explicitly inclusive.
Denition 24 (Disjunctive Factbases) The system of disjunctive factbases is dened as
VBF := h f;g; ; PCan(2
2Lit); `; L( ;;^;_; j); UpdB; L(;^;_); IncB ; Lit
_ i
VmiF and VexF are formed from VBF in the same way as Bmi and Bex are formed from B.
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We have to show that VBF , VexF and VmiF satisfy the KS postulates. KS1, KS2 and
KS4 are obvious. KS3 (Reexivity), KS5 (Knowledge Ordering Adequacy), and KS6 (Amplia-
tive=Persistent) are proved in the same way as for B, now using
LPersQ = LAmpI = LInput = L(;^;_) 2
Notice that by the addition of weak negation and exclusive disjunction, inference in disjunctive
factbases is no longer persistent.
Conjecture 1 Disjunctive factbases capture paraminimal reasoning in partial logic. Let X
be a nite subset of L(;^;_), and F 2 L( ;;^;_; j). Then,
X j=pm4 F i UpdB(0;X) ` F
where X j=pm4 F is dened as PMin(Mod4(X))  Mod4(F ).
Observation 14 VBF violates the principle of Negation Coherence: if, e.g., Y = ffp; qg;
fp;pgg, then Y ` p, but Y 6`  p. On the other hand, Coherence holds in VmiF and in VexF .
Observation 15 VmiF is non-explosive and negation coherent. It has (a restricted form of)
the Disjunctive Syllogism. E.g.,
Updmi(0; (p _ q) ^ p) = ffq;pgg ` q, while
Updmi(ffqgg; (p _ q) ^ p) = ffp;p;qg; fp; q;qgg 6` q
This example also shows that neither Permutation nor Update Monotonicity hold in VmiF .
Observation 16 Only VmiF is a vivid knowledge system. VexF is not vivid since it is explo-
sive, VBF is not vivid since it violates Negation Coherence.
Claim 5 (Collapse of weak and strong negation) Let Y 2 Cons(PCan(22
Lit
)), and a 2
At. Then, whenever Y ` a _ a, weak and strong negation coincide for a in VmiF and VexF :
Y ` a i Y `  a
Proof: Since Y is consistent, all X 2 Y are consistent, and consequently, a _ a is derivable
from Y i either a 2 X or a 2 X for all X 2 Y , subsuming three cases:
1. If all X 2 Y contain a, then neither Y ` a nor Y `  a.
2. If all X 2 Y contain a, then both Y ` a and Y `  a.
3. Otherwise some X 2 Y contain a, and all others contain a, hence Y 6` a, and Y 6`  a.
2
Notice that this does not hold in VBF
Claim 6 A disjunctive factbase is a unique representation, i.e. in VF (for  = B;mi; ex),
it holds that C(Y ) = C(Y 0) implies Y = Y 0.
Proof: In [Wag94], the Unique Representation property was shown for arbitrary Y  2Lit (the




F B Bex Bmi VBF VexF VmiF
Contraction
p p p p p p p p
Permutation
p p p p p p
Update Monotonicity
p p p p p p
Cumulativity
p p p p p
? ? ?
Monotonicity
p p p p
Unique Representation
p p p p p
non-explosive





Disjunctive Syllogism    
p p p p
Table 1: Formal properties of some basic knowledge systems (  denotes not applicable, ? denotes
open problem).
5 Exact Predicates and the Closed-World Assumption
In knowledge systems, three kinds of predicates can be distinguished. The rst distinction,
proposed by Korner in [Kor66], reects the fact that many predicates (especially in empirical
domains) have truth value gaps: neither p(c) nor p(c) has to be the case for specic instances
of such inexact predicates, like, e.g., color attributes which can in some cases not be determined
because of vagueness.
Other predicates, e.g. from legal or theoretical domains, are exact, and we then have, for
instance, m(S) _ m(S) and prime(277   1) _ prime(277   1), stating that Sophia is either
married or unmarried and that 277   1 is either a prime or a non-prime number. Only exact
predicates can be totally represented in a knowledge base. Therefore, only exact predicates can
be subject to the Closed-World Asssumption.
As in relational database theory, we distinguish between the schema  and the instance,
resp. state, X 2 LKB of a vivid knowledge base. The schema determines the language of a KB,
i.e. the available predicates (relation symbols) together with their domains and their epistemic
category (exact or inexact). Since, in general, not all predicates are subject to the Closed-World
Assumption (CWA), the schema also stipulates those relation symbols for which the CWA will
be assumed. Finally, the schema contains a set of integrity constraints, i.e. closed query formulas
which have to be satised by any evolving state of an associated knowledge base.18
Denition 25 (VKB Schema) A vivid knowledge base schema is a quadruple
hRel; ExRel; CWRel; IC i
consisting of a set Rel of relation schemas, a set ExRel  Rel of exact relation symbols, a set
CWRel  ExRel of CWA relation symbols, and a set IC  LQuery of integrity constraints.
Denition 26 For a schema  = hRel; ExRel; CWRel; IC i, we say that Y is a knowledge
base over , denoted Y : , if
1. Y contains only predicates from Rel, such that the resp. domain constraints are satised.
18We shall not discuss integrity constraints in this paper.
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2. For any F 2 IC, Y ` F .
Denition 27 (Closed-World Assumption) For vivid knowledge bases Y : , we have
the following additional inference rule for inferring negative conclusions,19
Y ` p(c) if p 2 CWRel & Y `  p(c)
together with the corresponding extension of update,
Upd(Y;p(c)) = Upd(Y; p(c)) if p 2 CWRel
Notice that this CWA inference rule refers to both the state and the schema, i.e. it leads to
an extension of the basic inference relation ` dened by the underlying KS. The connection
between them can be expressed by means of the CWA closure:
CWA(Y ) := Upd(Y; fp(c) : p 2 CWRel & c 2 Const & KB `  p(c)g)
Obviously, we have Y ` F i CWA(Y ) ` F .
Example 6 (The CWA in Factbases) While we cannot assume the CWA for empirical
predicates like smoker, we should also not assume it for the relation married in some local KB
since people may get married all over the world, and thus married will not be totaly represented
in a local KB. We may assume the CWA, however, for a predicate like resident, simply because
all residents of a city are registered in the local KB of that city. Thus, from the factbase
X3 = fs(S); m(P;L); r(P ); r(S)g
over a schema with CWRel = frg, we may infer that Peter is married with a non-resident,
Ans(CWA(X3);m(x; y) ^ r(y)) = fhP;Lig
but neither that he is married with a nonsmoker,
Ans(CWA(X3);m(x; y) ^ s(y)) = ;
nor that he is not married with Susan, CWA(X3) 6` m(P; S).
Denition 28 (Schema-Based Inference) A query F is inferable from a disjunctive fact-
base Y :  if it can be derived from the closure of Y with respect to ExRel and CWRel. Formally,
Y ` F :() Exact(Y ) ` F
where
Exact(Y ) = Upd(CWA(Y ); fp(c) _ p(c) : p 2 ExRel  CWRel & c 2 Constg)
19The Closed-World Assumption, in a less general form, was originally proposed in [Rei78]. Notice that our
form of the CWA relates explicit with default-implicit falsity, i.e. strong with weak negation: an atomic sentence
formed with a totaly represented predicate is (explicitly) false if it is false by default, i.e. its strong negation holds
if its weak negation does.
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Notice that in KBs of denite knowledge systems, like factbases, it is not possible to declare
exact predicates not subject to the CWA. Therefore, in denite knowledge systems, ExRel =
CWRel.
Observation 17 For a schema  = hRel; ExRel; CWRel; IC i, and a knowledge base Y over
, it holds that
1. for any exact predicate p 2 ExRel , and any constant c from its domain, the resp. instance
of the tertium non datur holds: Y ` p(c) _ p(c);
2. if q 2 CWRel, then Y does not contain any indenite information on q, i.e. Y ` q(c), or
Y ` q(c).
Inputs leading to the violation of integrity constraints have to be rejected. The update operation
for disjunctive factbases has to be modied accordingly.
Denition 29 (Schema-Based Update)
Upd (Y; F ) = fX 2 Upd(Y; F ) : X ` ICg
where  = B;mi; ex.
6 Reasoning with Three Kinds of Predicates
Only certain exact predicates can be totally represented in a KB. Totally represented exact
predicates are subject to the CWA. For example, the local KB of some city knows all residents
of the city, i.e. the CWA holds for resident, but it does not have complete information of every
resident whether (s)he is married or not because (s)he might have married in another city and
this information is not present. Consequently, the CWA does not apply to married in this KB.
The CWA helps to reduce disjunctive complexity which is exponential in the number of exact
non-CWA predicates: if n is the number of unknown ground atoms which can be formed by
means of predicates declared as exact but not subject to the CWA by a VKB, then the VKB
contains 2n possible situation descriptions.
We illustrate these distinctions with an example. Let m; r; s; l denote the predicates married,
resident, smoker and is looking at, and let M;P; S stand for the individuals Mary, Peter and
Susan. Let
Y = ffm(M); r(M); s(M); m(S); s(S); l(M;P ); l(P; S)gg
be a disjunctive factbase over the schema  = hfm; r; s; lg; fm; rg; frg; ;i. The interesting
queries we can ask Y and the resp. answers are:
1. Does a married person look at an unmarried one ? Yes, but Y does not know who, either
Mary at Peter, or Peter at Susan:
Y ` 9x; y : l(x; y) ^m(x) ^ m(y)
Ans(Y; l(x; y) ^m(x) ^ m(y)) = ffhM;P i; hP; Sigg
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2. Does a resident look at a non-resident ? Yes, Mary at Peter.
Ans(Y; l(x; y) ^ r(x) ^ r(y)) = ffhM;P igg
since Y ` r(P ) if Y `  r(P ).
3. Does a smoker look at a nonsmoker ? No. Y is completely ignorant about Peter being
a smoker or not: neither is he a smoker, nor is he a nonsmoker, nor is he a smoker or
nonsmoker (he might be neither):
Ans(Y; l(x; y) ^ s(x) ^ s(y)) = ;
Notice that the explicit tertium-non-datur completion of Y wrt ExRel would yield 23 = 8 possible
situation descriptions, which are reduced to 21 = 2 by the CWA declaration of resident.20
7 A General Construction of Disjunctive Knowledge Systems
We now generalize the previous discussion of specic disjunctive knowledge systems. Let
K = h 0; ; LKB; `; LQuery; Upd; LInput; Inc; LUnit i
We shall inductively dene the extension of K to a disjunctive knowledge system VK,21 with











A disjunctive knowledge base Y 2 L_KB consists of a set of KBs, each one describing a possible
situation, i.e. L_KB  2
LKB , and the elements of Y represent dierent epistemic alternatives. The
knowledge ordering is dened as
Y _ Y
0 :() 8X 0 2 Y 0 9X 2 Y : X  X 0
implying that 0_ := f0g. Only paracanonical elements of 2
LKB will be accepted as KBs, i.e.
L_KB = PCan(2
LKB).
A query formula F 2 L_Query can be inferred from Y if it can be inferred from every possible
situation description X 2 Y :
Y `_ F :() for all X 2 Y : X ` F;
i.e. L_Query = LQuery.
Inputs to a disjunctive knowledge base Y are processed in the following way:
Upd_B(Y; u) = fUpd(X;u) : X 2 Y g for u 2 LUnit




B(Y; F ); G)
Upd_B(Y; F _G) = PMin(Upd
_





20Without the CWA there are 3 tertium non datur disjunctions formed with m(P ), r(S), and r(P ), while with
the CWA there is only one such disjunction: m(P ) _ m(P ).
21V stands for disjunction.
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All other cases of compound formulas are treated by DeMorgan-style rewriting. We dene two
further update operations:
Cons(Y ) := fX 2 Y j Inc(X) = ;g
MInc(Y ) := fX 2 Y j :9X 0 2 Y : Inc(X 0)  Inc(X)g
Upd_ex(Y; F ) := Cons(Upd
_
B(Y; F ))
Upd_mi(Y; F ) := MInc(Upd
_
B(Y; F ))
The elementary pieces of information in disjunctive KBs are disjunctions of information units
u1 _ : : : _ um. The set of all such disjunctions is denoted by L
_
Unit. The inconsistency operation
Inc_ collects all contradictory disjunctions of elements from LUnit:
Inc_(Y ) := f
_
U : U 2 Min(fU 0  LUnit j 8X 2 Y 9u 2 U
0 : u 2 Inc(X)g) g
We obtain the following systems:
VBK = h f0g; _; PCan(2
LKB); `_; LQuery; Upd
_
B ; L(;^;_); Inc_; L
_
Unit i
and VexK and VmiK as before.
8 A Case Study: Disjunctive Deductive Factbases
Using the above construction we can form VDF ,  = B;mi; ex, the system of disjunctive
deductive factbases (DDFB). A DDFB is a paracanonical set of deductive factbases.
Example 7 Y7 = fhX1; R1i; : : : ; hX7; R7i g, where
i Xi Ri
1 fpg fr   (p ^ q)g
2 fqg fp  (p ^ q)g
3 fqg fr   (p ^ q)g
4 fqg fp  (p ^ q); r   (p ^ q)g
5 fp; qg fp  (p ^ q)g
6 fp; qg fr   (p ^ q)g
7 fp; qg fp  (p ^ q); r   (p ^ q)g
is a DDFB. In VexDF , we obtain e.g. Y7 `  p _ r _ q.
Observation 18 An extended disjunctive logic program (EDLP) can be transformed into a
DDFB.
Proof: An EDLP consists of rules of the form H  B, where H  Lit, and B  XLit. Starting
from the empty DDFB, Y0 = h;; ;i, we successively `compile' all the EDLP rules Hi  Bi,
i = 1; : : : ;m, into the resp. DDFB;
Yi = PMin(f [ f
_
G Big :  2 Yi 1 & G  Hig) 2
This is similar to the `split database' procedure of [Sak89]. Notice, however, that by our PMin-
normalization, we do not get the problem of non-cumulativity whereas adding a disjunctive
lemma may change the set of `possible models'.
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Example 7 (continued) The DDFB from the previous example is the result of compiling
the EDLP 7 = fp _ q; p _ r   (p ^ q)g.
Conjecture 2 The answer set semantics [GL91] of an extended disjunctive logic program 
can be captured by discarding all nonminimal elements of the corresponding DDFB Y: every
answer set of  corresponds to a stable closure of some element of Min(Y).
For instance, the stable closures of Min(Y7) are fp; rg, fq;pg, and fq; rg which are exactly the
answer sets of 7.
9 Conclusion
The system of disjunctive factbases which captures the inference relation based on paraminimal
models is the paradigm for disjunctive knowledge systems. We have shown that there is an
underlying general construction of disjunctive knowledge systems which can be applied to all
kinds of denite base systems.
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